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Abstract
We consider non-cooperative environments in which two players have the power to com-
mit but cannot sign binding agreements. We show that by committing to a set of actions
rather than to a single action, players can implement a wide range of action proﬁles. We
give a complete characterization of implementable proﬁles and provide a simple method to
ﬁnd them. Proﬁles implementable by bilateral commitments are shown to be generically
ineﬃcient. Surprisingly, allowing for gradualism (i.e., step by step commitment) does not
change the set of implementable proﬁles.
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11 Introduction
An essential insight of Schelling (1960) is that a player can strengthen his position by committing
to some actions. For example, a monopolist can deter entry by committing to ﬁght any eventual
entry. However, suppose that the potential entrant can simultaneously commit to enter the
market, say by installing capacities. The monopolist commitment is then inconsistent with
the entrant commitment: the monopolist would rather accommodate the entry. What are the
consistent commitments in such a game? The main theme of this paper is precisely to study
situations, as the above example, in which all the players in a game can simultaneously and
perfectly commit to subsets of actions before playing a game. Before going further, we like to
stress that players are not assumed to commit to a particular action, but rather to rule out sets
of actions.1 Classical examples of such commitments are ﬁrms choosing capacity constraints, an
army general burning a bridge behind his troops, a candidate promising not to raise taxes by
more than 5%, or a seller publicly announcing a menu of tariﬀs. In all these cases, reneging on
one’s commitment is either physically impossible or too costly to be considered.2
To model the possibility of commitment in games, we embed a strategic-form game G into
a two-stage game, in which players can restrict their action spaces in the ﬁrst stage (the com-
mitment stage), and play the game induced by their commitments in the second stage. Payoﬀs
are determined as in the original game G. We call this two-stage game, a game of commitment,
and consider the subgame perfect equilibria of games of commitment. More precisely, we are
interested in the complete characterization of the action proﬁles of G that are implementable by
commitments, that is, the action proﬁles played in the second stage in any subgame perfect equi-
librium. Our main contribution is to provide a complete characterization of the implementable
proﬁles of actions for two-player games with closed real intervals as action spaces, strictly quasi-
concave payoﬀ functions, and commitments to closed subintervals of the original action space.
These assumptions are met by many economic models, e.g., Cournot and diﬀerentiated Bertrand
duopoly games, games of tax competition, etc. In equilibrium, commitments are self-enforcing
in the sense that they are sustained by a simple sequential game structure, without assuming
any punishment scheme against deviating players.
The question whether an action proﬁle is implementable by a commitment is a complex one.
To see this, note that any action proﬁle belongs to an inﬁnite set of restricted action spaces.
1Our approach to commitment is shared by Hart and Moore (2004), who study the case of two contracting
parties who can restrict the set of outcomes over which they will bargain. One of the main diﬀerences between
their work and ours is that they assume that some uncertainty is being resolved after players have committed to
a set of outcomes and before the parties bargain over the ﬁnal outcome. Without such uncertainty, parties would
fully commit in the ﬁrst period in the framework of Hart and Moore (2004).
2See Caruana and Einav (2005) for a model in which commitment arises endogenously.
2Therefore, to ﬁnd out whether a proﬁle x is implementable by a commitment, we would have to
check whether it is implementable by any one of these inﬁnitely many pairs of restricted action
spaces. The main result of this paper is that an action proﬁle is implementable if and only if it
is implementable by what we call a “simple commitment.” In a simple commitment, one player
(he) commits to a single action, and the other player (she) truncates her action space at either
the top or the bottom. Moreover, the truncation is at her (original) best-reply to the single
action her opponent is committed to. It follows that for any action proﬁle, there are only four
such simple commitments. This result drastically reduces the complexity of our problem.
To get more intuition on the proﬁles of actions that are implementable, note that all Nash
equilibria of the original game are implementable. The intuition for this result is simple. Suppose
that each player commits to his equilibrium action in the ﬁrst stage of the game of commitment,
and plays a Nash equilibrium in any induced game. Given the commitment of a player, the other
player has obviously no incentive to deviate as he is already playing the best-reply to the single
action in the commitment set of his opponent. Similarly, all ‘lead-follow’ outcomes are imple-
mentable. A ‘lead-follow’ outcome is a subgame-perfect equilibrium outcome of the sequential
version of G, in which one player is moving ﬁrst and the other follows (Stackelberg outcomes in
duopoly games). To implement such outcomes it suﬃces that the ‘leader’ commits to a single
action (his action in the lead-follow proﬁle) and the other player does not restrict his action
space at all. This is not accidental, we show that all action proﬁles that can be implemented by
a game of commitment can be described as the equilibrium outcome of a generalized sequential
version of the game under consideration. Important insights about following and leading in
sequential games apply to the game of strategic commitment. We use these insights to translate
our characterization results into a geometrical representation. We can show in particular that
with a further restriction to games with strategic complementarities the best reply curves alone
suﬃce to characterize all implementable proﬁles, in this case the set of implementable proﬁles
is bounded by the Nash- and follow-lead equilibrium outcomes.
We pursue our characterization by considering a variant of our commitment game, allowing
players to commit in several steps. In a recent paper, Lockwood and Thomas (2002) indeed show
that gradualism may enforce partial cooperation that is not attainable in one step commitment.
It turns out that this is not the case in our setup: a proﬁle is implementable in T rounds of
commitment if and only if it is implementable in one round.
Finally, an important question is whether bilateral commitment may help players to improve
over the status quo, i.e., the Nash equilibria of the original game. First, we show that the players
cannot, generically speaking, implement eﬃcient outcomes using commitments.3 Second, we
3This result parallels Dubey’s (1986) theorem that shows that Nash equilibria of smooth games are generically
ineﬃcient.
3show that when ‘lead-follow’ equilibria, which are always implementable by commitment, do
not give both players a higher payoﬀ than the Nash equilibria, then no Pareto improvements are
implementable in the important class of games with strategic complementarities and constant
consonance, that is, when the payoﬀ of a player is monotone in the action of his opponent.
Finally, we give an example of a game with a non-monotonic best reply curve in which parties
can Pareto improve upon a unique Nash equilibrium even though the ‘follow-lead’ equilibria
do not Pareto dominate the Nash equilibrium. Thus, we conclude on a positive note: bilateral
commitments might improve the welfare of each player.
The idea that the power to commit oneself can be beneﬁcial has received a great deal of
attention in economics. A (very) partial list of contributions includes applications in indus-
trial organization (e.g., Dixit (1980) or Spulber (1981)), international trade (e.g., Brander and
Spencer (1985)), political economy (e.g., Yildirim (2005)), to name just a few.4 Most of these
applications can be seen as special cases of our theory, in the sense that commitments made
in an initial stage restrict the set of actions available in a later stage. Closely related to our
work is the literature on endogenous timing in games e.g., Hamilton and Slustky (1990), Amir
and Grilo (1999), van Damme and Hurkens (1999), or Romano and Yildirim (2005).5 The aim
of this literature is to obtain Cournot-Nash and Stackelberg outcomes as equilibrium outcomes
of a two-player commitment game, hence endogenizing the order of moves. The present work
diﬀers from this literature in two important aspects. First, in our model, commitments are
not restricted to commitments to single actions.6 In other words, a commitment in our game
might leave something open to change. Second, our purpose is not to endogenize the timing of
moves in games, but to explore how the ability to commit aﬀects the equilibrium payoﬀs, and
its welfare properties. Thus, our approach is conceptually diﬀerent from the approach followed
in the endogenous timing literature. Our results, however, parallel the results in this literature
insofar as the additional ﬂexibility in the choice of commitments we postulate yields a range
of implementable proﬁles that is — in a sense to be deﬁned more precisely — bounded by
the Cournot-Nash and Stackelberg outcomes as extreme cases. Romano and Yildirim’s (2005)
paper is the closest to ours, though our work covers a much wider range of cases. First, our
commitment technology is more general in that players can restrict their action spaces from
the bottom and the top. Second, we do not assume diﬀerentiability of the payoﬀ functions,
monotonic best replies, a unique interior Nash equilibrium of the original game; assumptions all
made by Romano and Yildirim. Third, like us, Romano and Yildirim extend their commitment
4Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) diﬀers from our work in that capacity commitment in the ﬁrst stage does not
aﬀect the action set in the second stage, but the payoﬀs.
5See also Saloner (1987), Gale (2001) or Henkel (2002) among others.
6A notable exception is Romano and Yildirim (2005), who consider commitments to lower or upper bounds,
but not both.
4game by allowing players to commit in several steps. In this context, they also show that if a
proﬁle is implementable in T rounds of commitment (T ≥ 2), then it is also implementable in
1 round of commitment, but admit that they are unable to prove the converse, which we do;
thereby improving upon their results. Lastly, we also improve upon their work by extensively
discussing the welfare implications of our model and providing a geometric characterization of
the implementable proﬁles. Thus, our contribution is both conceptual and technical. In some
sense, our paper answers the question: when can we assume without loss of generality that a
player commits to a single action and the other player truncates his action space only at the
top or bottom? We also note that in Cournot duopoly games, the set of implementable actions
in our commitment games is equivalent to the one in Romano and Yildirim, thus rationalizing
their assumption of commitment to lower bounds only. However, in other examples e.g., rent
seeking games, their assumption is not without loss of generality.
We should also mention Jackson and Wilkie (2005). They also allow players to modify the
game to be played in a pre-play stage. The main diﬀerence between their work and ours lies in
the set of permissible modiﬁcations. While Jackson and Wilkie (2005) allow players to commit
to utility transfers in the second period, we allow players to discard any subset of actions in the
pre-play stage. These diﬀerent pre-play modiﬁcations yield diﬀerent results. Nash equilibria can
always be implemented in our framework but need not be implementable in theirs. On the other
hand, they show, like us, that pre-play modiﬁcations do not necessarily make eﬃcient outcomes
implementable. Finally, Renou (2006) provides a complete characterization of the equilibrium
payoﬀs in commitment games induced by n-player ﬁnite games.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we give a detailed description of the environ-
ment faced by the players, and deﬁne what we call the game of commitment. Section 3 presents
some preliminary results. In Section 4, we completely characterize the set of action proﬁles that
are implementable by self-enforcing bilateral commitment. Section 5 analyzes the welfare im-
plications of self-enforcing bilateral commitment. Section 6 discusses possible extensions. Most
proofs are relegated in the Appendix.
2 Games of commitment
2.1 Preliminaries
The initial situation we consider is a two-player strategic-form game G :=  N,(Yi,u i)i∈N  with
N = {1,2} the set of players, Yi the set of actions available to player i,a n dui : Y1 × Y2 → R
the payoﬀ function of player i.D e n o t e Y := Y1 × Y2. We call the opponent of player i,
player j. We assume that for each player i ∈{ 1,2}, Yi is a non-empty, compact, convex
subset of the real line. Without loss of generality, we take Yi =[ 0 ,1], for i ∈{ 1,2}.F o r
5each player i, the payoﬀ function ui is assumed to be continuous in all its arguments and
strictly quasi-concave in yi, i.e., for all yj ∈ [0,1], yi ∈ [0,1], y 
i ∈ [0,1], yi  = y 
i,a n dα ∈ (0,1),
ui(αyi+(1−α)y 
i,y j) > min{ui(yi,y j),u i(y 
i,y j)}.7 These assumptions are met by many economic
models.
We furthermore assume that players have the ability to unilaterally commit not to play some
actions, i.e., to restrict their action sets. Such commitments are assumed to be perfectly binding,
meaning that if player i restricts his action set to Xi, any action chosen later on must belong
to Xi.
Deﬁnition 1 A (bilateral) commitment is a pair (X1,X 2)w h e r ef o rb o t hi ∈{ 1,2}, Xi is a
non-empty, compact and convex subset of [0,1].
Thus, our deﬁnition of a commitment imposes on each player a restriction of his action
space.8
Henceforth, we write the restricted action space Xi of player i as a closed real interval
[xi,xi] ⊆ [0,1], where xi (xi) refers to the minimum (maximum) of player i’s restricted action
space. Note that player i can also commit to a singleton, in which case xi = xi.
It is important to note that a commitment does not necessarily prescribe the choice of an
action. In the words of Hart and Moore (2004), “in a bilateral commitment, the players commit
not to consider actions not on the list (X1,X 2), i.e., these actions are ruled out. Ex-post, the
players are free to choose from the list of actions speciﬁed in the commitment i.e., actions are
not ruled in.”
We say that the bilateral commitment (X1,X 2) induces the game G(X): = N,(Xi,u X
i ) ,
where X = X1 × X2,a n df o ri ∈{ 1,2}, uX
i (x)=ui(x) for all x ∈ X. Abusing notation, we will
drop the superscript X in the sequel. The induced game G(X) is thus obtained from the game G
by restricting the action sets of the players. We shall use the term ‘mother’ to make reference to
the original game G. For instance, we shall use the expressions mother game, mother best-reply,
mother action set, etc. Similarly, the term ‘induced’ will refer to the best reply, action sets etc.
in G(X). We denote by Yi the collection of all non-empty, compact, convex subsets of [0,1], and
7In the words of Moulin (1984), G is a two-player ‘nice game.’ It is worth noting that the mixed extensions
of any ﬁnite games do not satisfy our assumptions. First, payoﬀ functions are not strictly quasi-concave in such
games. Second, unless the ﬁnite game has only two actions per player, mixed action spaces are not a subset of
the real line. Consequently, the theory developed in this paper cannot be applied to mixed extensions of ﬁnite
games.
8That restrictions are assumed to be convex subsets is not without loss of generality. In particular it ensures
that the game played once players have chosen their restrictions has a Nash equilibrium. Imposing some Lipschitz
conditions is suﬃcient, however, to deal with non-convex restrictions. We also note that imposing convex strategy




2.2 Games of commitment
Given the strategic-form game G,t h egame of commitment Γ(G) is a two-stage game with
almost perfect information, in which:
Stage 1. Both players simultaneously choose action sets Xi ∈Y i.
Stage 2. Players play the induced strategic form game G(X).
A strategy for a player i in the game Γ(G)( f o rs h o r t ,Γ ) ,i sap a i rsi =( Xi,σ i)w h e r eXi ∈Y i,
and σi is a mapping from Y to [0,1] such that σi(X) ∈ Xi, for all X ∈Y. That is, a strategy for
a player prescribes a choice of a restriction Xi (ﬁrst-stage action) and, for each possible choice
of a restriction for both players in the ﬁrst-stage, an action xi ∈ Xi (second-stage action). The
outcome of a strategy proﬁle s =( si)i∈{1,2} is the pair (X,x)w h e r exi = σi(X) for each player
i ∈{ 1,2}. The payoﬀs over outcomes (X,x) are assumed to only depend on the action proﬁles
chosen in the second stage of the game and are given by the payoﬀs of the induced game G(X).
That is, we assume that player i derives utility ui(x)f r o mo u t c o m e( X,x). If (X,x)i st h e
outcome of strategy proﬁle s we call x the result of s.
The central concept of this paper is the concept of implementation by commitment, which
we now deﬁne.
Deﬁnition 2 An action proﬁle x is implementable by commitment X if the pair (X,x)i st h e
outcome of a subgame-perfect equilibrium of Γ.
Hence, a proﬁle x is implementable by commitment if it is a (stage 2) result of a subgame-
perfect equilibrium of Γ. In this paper, we focus on subgame-perfect equilibria in pure strategies.
3 Games induced by commitments
We ﬁrst derive some results concerning the proper subgames of Γ, namely the set of all induced
games G(X). The proofs of the results presented below, Lemmata 1 and 2 are in our companion
paper, Bade, Haeringer and Renou (2005).
Deﬁne BRi :[ 0 ,1] → [0,1], the (mother) best-reply of player i in the game G,w i t hf o r
yj ∈ [0,1],
BRi(yj)={yi ∈ [0,1] : ui(yi,y j) ≥ ui(y 
i,y j) for all y 
i ∈ [0,1]}.
When players commit to play in the set X,t h eb e s t - r e p l ym a pbrX
i : Xj → Xi of player i is
deﬁned similarly, bearing in mind that now player i cannot choose an action outside Xi,t h a ti s ,
7for all xj ∈ Xj,
brX
i (xj)={xi ∈ Xi : ui(xi,x j) ≥ ui(x 
i,x j) for all x 
i ∈ Xi}.




i .T h a ti s ,br
Xi
i is the restricted best-reply
of player i when he is committed to Xi and player j can choose any action in [0,1]. Note that
best-reply maps are non-empty, single valued and continuous. Furthermore, the strict quasi-
concavity of payoﬀ functions enables us to easily characterize the mapping brX
i as a function of
BRi and X.
Lemma 1 Player i’s best-reply function in G(X), brX




⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
xi if BRi(xj) <x i ,
BRi(xj) if xi ≤ BRi(xj) ≤ xi ,
xi if xi <B R i(xj).
In words, the best-reply map brX
i of the restricted game G(X) agrees with the best-reply
map BRi of the mother game G on the set {xj ∈ Xj : BRi(xj) ∈ Xi}, and is either xi or xi,
otherwise. Lemma 1 is illustrated in Figures (1a) and (1b). In the former it displays a mother






















Figure 1: Mother and restricted best-replies
Denote N(G)a n dN(G(X)) the set of Nash equilibria of G and G(X), respectively. Observe
that the mother game G as well as any induced game G(X) has a Nash equilibrium in pure
8actions. Our next lemma states that if a proﬁle of actions x∗ is an equilibrium of G(X), but is
not an equilibrium of the mother game G,t h e nx∗ ∈ bdY (X), the relative boundary of X in Y .9
Lemma 2 If x∗ ∈ N(G(X)) \ N(G),t h e nx∗ ∈ bdY (X).
Lemma 2 states that if a commitment X∗ implements a result x∗ that is not an equilibrium of
G, then it must be the case that for at least one player, say i, the action x∗
i is either the maximum
or the minimum of X∗
i . Lemma 2 thus provides a ﬁrst intuition about the set of implementable
proﬁles. Namely, if the implemented proﬁle is not a Nash equilibrium of the mother game G,
then the action of at least one player identiﬁes with the boundary of his restricted action space.
4 Implementation by commitments
4.1 Existence
We start by observing that the existence of a subgame-perfect equilibrium of Γ is not, ap r i o r i ,
guaranteed, for the cardinality of each player’s strategy set in Γ is uncountable. It turns out,
however, that the issue of equilibrium existence in our case is easily solved.10
Proposition 1 The game of commitment has an equilibrium.
Proof. Since Γ(G) is a ﬁnite horizon game, we can use the one-shot deviation property to
check that a proﬁle is an equilibrium —see Osborne and Rubinstein (1994, p. 103). Choose
y∗ ∈ N(G) and consider for each player i the strategy s∗
i =( {y∗
i },σ∗
i ), with (σ∗
i (X))i∈{1,2} a
Nash equilibrium of G(X) for any ﬁrst-stage actions (commitment) X. By construction, no
player can proﬁtably change his second-stage action. Observe that since for both i ∈{ 1,2} we
have y∗
i = BRi(y∗
j), neither player can obtain a strictly higher payoﬀ than ui(y∗). Therefore,
given the restriction of player i to {y∗
i },p l a y e rj cannot increase his utility by changing his
restriction on his action space. 
The key observation in the proof of Proposition 1 is that any Nash equilibrium of the mother
game G is implementable. So, commitments have the power to perpetuate an existing situa-
9Let (Y,d)b eam e t r i cs p a c ea n dX ⊂ Y .Ap o i n tx is a boundary point of X in Y if each open neighborhood
U of x satisﬁes U ∩X  = ∅ and U ∩(Y \X)  = ∅. The set of all boundary points of X in Y is bdY X. For instance,
if Y =[ 0 ,1], bdY [0,1/2] = {1/2} while bdY [1/3,2/3] = {1/3,2/3}.
10See, for instance, Harris et al. (1995) for results on the existence of subgame-perfect equilibria for continuous
games with almost perfect information. It is worth noting that Proposition 1 holds independently of the number
of players involved in the mother game G.
9tion.11 Moreover, it should be noted that uniqueness is clearly not guaranteed. For instance, if G
has a multiplicity of equilibria, then we can already construct a multiplicity of subgame-perfect
equilibria of Γ.
4.2 A complete characterization
We are now ready to characterize the set of all action proﬁles that can be implemented by a
commitment. The main result of this section is that if a proﬁle of actions x is implementable,
then it is implementable by one of a very small number of bilateral commitments, those that we
call simple.
Deﬁnition 3 A bilateral commitment X is simple if it has the form ({xi},[0,BR j(xi)]) or
({xi},[BRj(xi),1]).
In a simple commitment, one player takes an extreme position, that of excluding all but
one action. The other player, player j, truncates his action space either from below or from
above, but not both. Moreover, the truncation is at his best-reply to the only action in player
i’s extreme commitment. We are now ready to formally state the main result of this section:
Theorem 1 An action proﬁle x∗ is implementable by a bilateral commitment if and only if it
is implementable by a simple bilateral commitment.
Before proving this characterization result, let us brieﬂy comment on the implications of this
theorem (see Section 5.5. for more on this). If we want to check whether a particular proﬁle
can be implemented by a commitment, we only need to check whether it can be implemented
by a simple commitment. This is a very manageable task, as for any action proﬁle x∗,t h e r ea r e











It is not diﬃcult to check whether an action proﬁle can be implemented by one of these four
simple commitments. Indeed, to check whether x∗ is implementable by ({x∗
1},[0,BR 2(x∗
1)]), it
suﬃces to check whether player 1 has an incentive to change his restricted action space. Observe
that in the second stage, neither player has an incentive to deviate (player 2 will be playing the
11In a related paper, Jackson and Wilkie (2005) propose a model in which players can commit to utility transfers
conditional on actions being played. They notably show that Nash equilibria of the game without transfer, the
mother game, might not be implementable, while they are in our paper. An essential diﬀerence between their
paper and our paper is that commitments can be undone in their paper by transferring back, while it is not
possible in our paper.
10mother best-reply to player 1’s action, and player 1 does not have any choice). Furthermore,
given that player 1 commits to {x∗
1}, player 2 does not have an incentive to alter his commitment,
the mother best-reply to x∗
1 is already contained in [0,BR 2(x∗
1)]). Therefore, we only need to
check whether player 1 has an incentive to deviate in the ﬁrst stage of the game. Notice that for
any restriction X1 player 1 may choose the proﬁle played in the second stage must be a Nash
equilibrium of G(X1 × X∗
2). So, if player 1 chooses the restriction {x1} for some x1 ∈ [0,1],
the second stage result will be (x1,br
[0,BR2(x∗
1)]
2 (x1)). Consequently, the action proﬁle x∗ is an
equilibrium if x∗







In Section 5.5, we take this optimization program as a starting point for a geometric char-
acterization of implementable proﬁles.
4.3 Proof of Theorem 1
In this section, we present the main steps leading to Theorem 1 and give intuitions for these
intermediate results. Detailed proofs can be found in the Appendix. We start by showing a key
result, namely if a result x∗ is implementable, then for at least one player i ∈{ 1,2}, x∗
i is a
mother best-reply to x∗
j.
Proposition 2 Let x∗ be implementable by some bilateral commitment X∗.T h e nx∗
i = BRi(x∗
j)
for at least one player i ∈{ 1,2}.
To see the intuition behind Proposition 2, suppose that a proﬁle x∗ is implementable by
the bilateral commitment X∗ such that neither player is using his mother best-reply. From
Lemma 2 this means that for both players the constraints imposed by the commitment bind.
The continuity of the best replies implies that for all of player 2’s actions in a suﬃciently small
interval (x∗
2 − ε,x∗
2 + ε) around x∗
2, player 1’s restricted best reply remains x∗
1. Let us now
consider a diﬀerent restriction for player 2. Take a {x 
2} such that x 
2 is 1) closer to player 2’s
mother best-reply to x∗
1, BR2(x∗
1), and 2) inside the interval (x∗
2 − ε,x∗
2 + ε). (See Figure 2.)
The strict quasi-concavity of player 2’s payoﬀ function implies that the result (x∗
1,x  
2) is strictly
preferred to x∗. This implies that player 2 has a proﬁtable deviation, a contradiction with our
assumption that x∗ is implementable with the bilateral commitment X∗.
Proposition 3 Let x∗ be implementable by some bilateral commitment X∗ with x∗
j = BRj(x∗
i).
Then x∗ is also implementable by the bilateral commitment X , such that X 
i = {x∗

























Figure 2: Illustration of Proposition 2
There is a tight connection between Proposition 2 and Proposition 3. By Proposition 2,
we know that in any equilibrium outcome (X∗,x ∗)o fΓ ,x∗
j = BRj(x∗
i) for at least one player
j ∈{ 1,2}. Imagine now that player i commits to the singleton {x∗
i}. Since player j can still play
BRj(x∗
i) in the second stage and there player i has no other choice but playing x∗
i in the second
stage, player j has no incentive to deviate. If player i can proﬁtably deviate when choosing the
restriction {x∗
i}, he can also proﬁtably deviate when choosing the restriction X∗
i . This, however,
cannot be true as we started out with the assumption the (X∗,x ∗) is an equilibrium outcome of
the game.
The main insight of Proposition 3 is that if (x∗
i,BR j(x∗
i)) is implementable by a bilateral
commitment X∗, then it is also implementable by the commitment
X  =( {x∗
i},X∗
j ). (2)
To obtain Theorem 1, it suﬃces then to show that X∗
j can be reduced to be either [0,x ∗
j]o r
[x∗
j,1]. We establish precisely that in the following proposition.
Proposition 4 Let x∗ be implementable by some bilateral commitment ({x∗
i},X∗
j ) with x∗
j =
BRj(x∗





i),1] or X 
j =[ 0 ,BR j(x∗
i)].
Now to prove Theorem 1, take any implementable action proﬁles x∗ and let X∗ be a bilateral
commitment that implements it. By Proposition 3, we know that the commitment ({x∗
i},X∗
j )
for i ∈{ 1,2} does also implement x∗. Finally, from Proposition 4, we know that an action
12proﬁle that can be implemented by such a commitment can also be implemented by a simple
commitment. In sum, these arguments imply that an action proﬁle can be implemented by a
commitment only if it can be implemented by a simple commitment. Conversely, any action
proﬁle that can be implemented by a simple commitment can be implemented by a commitment.
This completes the proof of Theorem 1.
4.4 Multi-period games of commitment
It is often conjectured that the lack of enforcement options may be overcome by considering
gradual commitments, thus allowing to implement outcomes that could not be attainable if
players can only commit once.12 The intuition that drives this conjecture is that in a dynamic
setting players may ﬁnd it proﬁtable to make ‘small’ commitment. Such small commitments
might incentive the opponent to also commit but have the merit to minimize the loss if the
opponent does not commit. Two central contributions on this issue are Admati and Perry (1991)
and Lockwood and Thomas (2002). Admati and Perry (1991) consider a model in which players
can make repeated voluntary contributions to ﬁnance a project. This latter is implemented
only if the sum of the contribution passes a threshold. The game stops as soon as the project
is implemented. Lockwood and Thomas (2002) consider a ﬁnitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma
with continuous action space in which at each stage players can only increase their level of
cooperation. Both models show that eﬃcient, or nearly eﬃcient outcomes can be obtained.13 In
this section, we follow this line of research by considering a multi-period game of commitment,
denoted ΓT.
In the game ΓT,p l a y e r sf a c eT periods of commitment and one ﬁnal stage in which they play
the game induced by their commitments. In each period t =1 ,...,T, players simultaneously
restrict their action spaces with the constraint that the restriction at stage t has to be a non-
empty, compact, convex subset of the restricted action space at period t − 1. That is, if Xt
i
denotes the restriction of player i at period t then Xt+1
i ⊆ Xt
i. Finally, in period T +1 ,pl a y e rs
play the game induced by the commitment of period T, the game G(XT).
One may imagine that allowing for several stages of commitment may change the set of
12See Schelling (1956) for an early account on this issue.
13The models of Admati and Perry (1991) and Lockwood and Thomas (2002) do not separate as clearly as we
do the commitment decision from the decision of choosing which action to play. Their models are simply repeated
games in which the assumption that at each stage players cannot use an action ‘lower’ than their action at the
previous stage. First, this implies that in their models players can only restrict their action sets by choosing
a lower bound (the contribution level in Admati and Perry (1991) or the cooperation level in Lockwood and
Thomas (2002)). Second, a key diﬀerence is that in their model, the payoﬀ is dependent on the sequence of
commitments (lower bounds), while in our model we do assume that commitments do not enter directly the
payoﬀ functions.
13implementable proﬁles. In fact, it turns out that in our context this is not the case.
Theorem 2 For any T a proﬁle of actions x∗ is implementable in the multi-period game of
commitment ΓT(G) if and only if it is implementable in a game of commitment Γ(G).
The proof of this theorem heavily rests on a result similar to that of Proposition 2, i.e., if x∗
is implementable in T rounds of commitment then at least one player is best-replying. A key
observation to prove Theorem 2 is that for any equilibrium s∗ of ΓT, we can always construct
a new equilibrium proﬁle ˆ s in which players’ ﬁrst stage restrictions are the same as their last
restrictions under s∗ (on the equilibrium path), and at all other subsequent stages players do
not further restrict their action spaces. Hence, from the perspective of characterizing the set of
implementable proﬁles repeating the number of stages at which players can restrict their action
spaces does not enrich our model.
4.5 The geometry of implementable proﬁles
As already pointed out, Theorem 1 has remarkable implications for the characterization of the
implementable action proﬁles of a game of commitment. To check whether a proﬁle of actions
x is implementable, it suﬃces to follow a simple four-step procedure:
Step 1. Check whether x lies on the graph of the best-reply map of at least one player. If not,
then x is not implementable. If yes, go to step 2.
Step 2. Check whether x lies on the best-reply graphs of both players. If yes, then x is imple-
mentable since it is an equilibrium of the mother game G.I fn o t ,g ot os t e p3 .
Step 3. Without loss of generality, assume that xj = BRj(xi). Construct the simple commitments
({xi},[0,BR j(xi)]) and ({xi},[BRj(xi),1]). Go to step 4.
Step 4. Check whether x 
i maximizes ui(·,br
[0,BRj(xi)]
j (·)) or ui(·,br
[BRj(xi),1]
j (·)). If yes, then x is
implementable. If not, then x is not implementable.
Steps 1 and 2 are easily translated into geometric analysis. An action proﬁle can be imple-
mented only if it lies on the best-reply curve of at least one player. If it lies on the best-reply
curves of both players, this action proﬁle is an equilibrium of the mother game, and from Propo-
sition 1, it is implementable. Therefore, we are left with the question: which of the action
proﬁles that lie on only one best-reply curve can be implemented? Steps 3 and 4 give the an-
swer. However, these last two steps do not translate as easily into geometric analysis. In the
sequel, we show that simple geometric arguments can be used to show that certain portions of
the best-reply curves of the players cannot be implemented. Furthermore, we show that for a
14certain class of games, the set of implementable proﬁles can even be completely characterized
by a straightforward geometric procedure.
To get this result, we ﬁrst show that any equilibrium outcome can be described as a two step
optimization program,
Proposition 5 An outcome (X∗,x ∗) is an equilibrium outcome of Γ(G) if and only if, for at












Figure 3 illustrates the logic of Proposition 5. The outcome (x∗,X∗)w i t hX∗ =( {x∗
i},[0,xj])
is an equilibrium outcome as the proﬁle of actions x∗ is associated with player i’s highest indif-
ference curves ICi on the section of player j restricted best-reply curve br
[0,xj]
j that corresponds
with his mother best-reply curve BRj.O b s e r v e t h a t x∗ is also implementable by the simple
bilateral commitment ({x∗
i},[0,x ∗












Figure 3: The geometry of Proposition 5
Remark 1 From Proposition 5, we have that x∗ is implementable by the commitment X∗ if
x∗
i maximizes the payoﬀ of player i being on the graph of the restricted best-reply of player j.
This result has thus the ﬂavor of the outcome of a sequential game in which player i moves ﬁrst.
Intuitively, this is not surprising since, as already pointed out by Schelling (1960), the power to
15commit oneself is equivalent to a ﬁrst move.14 Hence, implementable proﬁles of actions have a
Stackelberg-type structure, one player ‘leads’ the commitment while the other ‘follows.’
We now provide a geometric condition that has to hold for a proﬁle of actions to be im-
plementable. In other words, if this condition does not hold at a proﬁle of actions x∗ with
x∗
j = BRj(x∗
i), then x∗ is not implementable; it does not solve the above maximization program.
For simplicity, assume that the (mother) best-reply maps and payoﬀ functions are continuously
diﬀerentiable.15 The geometric condition relates the slope of the indiﬀerence curve of player i
at x∗ with the slope of the best-reply of player j at the same action proﬁle x∗.
Proposition 6 Let x∗ be an implementable proﬁle of actions with x∗
j = BRj(x∗
i),a n dx∗ in-
terior. It cannot be true that the slope of player i’s indiﬀerence curve at x∗ is strictly negative
(resp., positive) while the slope of player j’s (mother) best-reply at x∗ is positive (resp., negative).
Proposition 6 thus provides a general geometric condition for implementability: the slope of
player i’s indiﬀerence curve and the slope of player j’s best-reply must have the same sign. For
instance, in Figure 4, x∗ is not implementable since BRj is positively sloped at x∗ while player
i’s indiﬀerence curve ICi is negatively sloped. Hence, to look for implementable action proﬁles,
we can restrict our attention to the proﬁles that are on the positively (resp., negatively) sloped
portions of the best-reply curve of player j in the positive (resp., negative) indiﬀerence curve
section of player i. This condition is not suﬃcient, however. In what follows, we give a necessary
and suﬃcient geometric condition for implementation in an important class of mother games.
Consider the class of games with strategic complementarities.16 Furthermore, we assume
that the function ui(·,BR j(·)) is strictly quasi-concave in xi, for all i ∈{ 1,2}.17 For simplicity,
we also assume that player i’s payoﬀ is increasing in player j’s action xj for all i ∈{ 1,2},t h a t
14There is now an abundant literature on imperfect competition whose purpose is to obtain Cournot and
Stackelberg outcomes as equilibrium outcomes of the same model. Interestingly, several models use an approach
similar to ours: they give the possibility to the ﬁrms to commit to some actions —see for instance Hamilton
and Slutsky (1990) , van Damme and Hurkens (1999) or more recently Romano and Yildirim (2005), and the
references therein. More precisely, ﬁrms in most of these models are assumed to commit either to a single action
or to not commit at all. A notable exception is Romano and Yildirim (2005) who assume that ﬁrms can restrict
their action sets only from the bottom, i.e., ﬁrms can only accumulate. Hence these models can be seen as a
simpliﬁed version of our approach. Hamilton and Slutsky’s main result is that the only equilibrium result that
can be obtained are the Cournot and the Stackelberg outcomes, while our approach allows for a larger set of
equilibrium results.
15The assumption of diﬀerentiability is not crucial, but greatly simpliﬁes the exposition.
16See Fudenberg and Tirole (1991, p. 490) for a deﬁnition. It is worth noting that a similar characterization
holds for games with strategic substitutabilities.















Figure 4: The proﬁle x∗ is not implementable.
is, the game has positive consonance.18 We show that for this class of games, the knowledge of
the Nash equilibria of G along with the knowledge of the ‘lead-follow’ proﬁles is necessary and
suﬃcient to completely characterize the set of implementable proﬁles of actions.
First, we need to order the set of Nash equilibria of G. Deﬁne x∗(1) the Nash equilibrium
of G with the lowest coordinate for player i, that is, there does not exist another equilibrium x
of G such that xi <x ∗
i(1). Similarly, deﬁne x∗(2) the equilibrium of G with the second lowest
coordinate for player i, and so on recursively.19 Note that since best-reply maps are single-
valued, x∗(k) is a singleton for any k>0. Moreover, the set of equilibria of G is generically
ﬁnite and odd (see Harsanyi (1973)), hence there generically exists a ﬁnite odd number K of
x∗(k)’s. (See Figure 5.)
Second, deﬁne (li,BR j(li)) the proﬁle of actions such that li maximizes ui(·,BR j(·)), that is,
t h ep r o ﬁ l eo fa c t i o n s( li,BR j(li)) is the lead-follow proﬁle with player i as the leader. It is worth
noting that since ui(·,BR i(·)) is strictly quasi-concave in xi and BRj single-valued, li is unique.
Moreover, since BRi and ui are non-decreasing functions of xj,w eh a v et h a tli ≥ x∗
i(K) for all
i ∈{ 1,2} (See Lemma A3 in the Appendix). Our next proposition states that the knowledge of
18This assumption is not crucial. A complete characterization without this assumption is available upon request.
19Formally, let x
∗(0) = ∅, and deﬁne for any k>0,
x
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17li and the x∗(k)’s is necessary and suﬃcient to completely characterize the set of implementable
proﬁles of actions.
Before stating the proposition, let us introduce a last piece of notation. Deﬁne Ii as a subset







i(k +1 ) ]∪ [x∗
i(K),l i]. (3)
Observe that the set Ii is uniquely deﬁned by the knowledge of li and the x∗(k)’s.
Proposition 7 Consider a game with strategic complementarities and positive consonance. The
set of implementable proﬁles of actions is I = I1 ∪I 2 with for i ∈{ 1,2}, j  = i:
Ii = {x : xj = BRj(xi),x i ∈ Ii}.
The intuition behind Proposition 7 is rather simple. First, note that since G is a game with
strategic complementarities, the best-reply maps are increasing. Moreover, the best-reply map
of any player, BRi, separates the action space [0,1]2 into two regions {x : xi <B R i(xj)}
where player i’s indiﬀerence curves are negatively sloped, and {x : xi >B R i(xj)} where
player i’s indiﬀerence curves are positively sloped. Second, for any x with xj = BRj(xi)a n d
xi ∈ (x∗
i(k),x ∗
i(k +1)), k even, we have xi <B R i(xj), hence player i’s indiﬀerence curve is neg-
atively sloped at x.S i n c eBRj is positively sloped, it follows from Proposition 6 that x is not
implementable. A similar argument holds for any x with xj = BRj(xi)a n dxi <x ∗
i(1). Finally,
any proﬁle of actions x with xj = BRj(xi)a n dxi ∈ (x∗
i(k),x ∗
i(k + 1)), k odd, is implementable
by the simple bilateral commitment ({xi},[0,BR j(xi)]). To see this, it is enough to observe
that player j’s best-reply br
[0,BRj(xi)]
j (x 
i)i sBRj(xj)f o rx 
i >x i,a n dBRj(x 
i), otherwise. The
strict quasi-concavity of ui and ui(·,BR j(·)) implies then that xi is solution of the optimization
program described in Proposition 5. The other cases are similar. See Figure 5 for the set of
implementable actions.
For the class of games with monotonic best-reply maps and ui(·,BR j(·)) strictly quasi-
concave in xi, the complete characterization of the set of implementable actions is therefore
purely geometric, and the only knowledge required is that of the Nash equilibria of G and the
lead-follow proﬁles.
5 The Social Value of Commitments
If we interpret our commitment game as a mechanism to implement a particular action proﬁles














Figure 5: The set of implementable proﬁles (in bold)
that quite generally such commitments are not self-enforcing. More precisely, we show that if G
is a smooth game, then we have generic ineﬃciency.
Next, we address the question of whether commitments are at least useful to implement
action proﬁles that Pareto dominate the Nash equilibria of the mother game. We conclude, on a
more positive note: we show that commitments can very well serve to make both players better
oﬀ if certain conditions are met.
5.1 Eﬃciency
Let us ﬁrst recall the deﬁnition of eﬃciency.
Deﬁnition 4 A proﬁle of actions y is eﬃcient if there does not exist another proﬁle of actions
y  such that ui(y ) ≥ ui(y) for all i ∈{ 1,2},a n dui(y ) >u i(y)f o rs o m ei ∈{ 1,2}.
Deﬁnition 4 is the textbook deﬁnition of (Pareto) eﬃciency. It is worth noting that several
related papers e.g., Jackson and Wilkie (2005) or Gomez and Jehiel (2005), use a stronger
concept of eﬃciency: a proﬁle of actions is eﬃcient if it maximizes the sum of players’ payoﬀs.
However, since we do not necessarily assume transferable utilities, our concept of eﬃciency is
more appropriate. Let us now turn to the concept of smooth games.
Deﬁnition 5 The game G is a smooth game if for all i ∈ N, ui is twice continuously diﬀeren-
tiable.
19Two remarks are in order. First, in virtually all economic models in which payoﬀ func-
tions are assumed to be continuous, payoﬀ functions are also assumed to be twice continuously
diﬀerentiable.20 For instance, linear-quadratic Cournot games or models of Bertrand competi-
tion with diﬀerentiated goods are smooth games. Second, we actually need the assumption of
diﬀerentiability only around equilibrium results.
Theorem 3 For any smooth game G, interior equilibrium results of the commitment game Γ(G)
are generically ineﬃcient.21
This result is reminiscent of Theorem 1 of Dubey (1986), which states that Nash equilibria
of smooth games are generically ineﬃcient. The main reason for hope that this result could be
overcome in the game of commitments is that the set of action proﬁles that can be implemented
is (in general a large) superset of the set of Nash equilibria of the mother game. So, there
is hope that this superset would also contain some eﬃcient proﬁles. However, our Theorem 3
shows that this does not hold true, just like Nash equilibria of smooth games, the proﬁles that
are implementable by commitments are generically ineﬃcient.
Not only is our Theorem 3 reminiscent of Dubey (1986), also the proof follows along similar
lines. The main diﬀerence (and diﬃculty) we face is that implementable proﬁles that are not
themselves Nash equilibria of the mother game lie on the boundary of the action space of the
subgame G(X)w i t hX the commitment that is implementing the proﬁle (Lemma 2). This
implies that diﬀerentiability of the restricted best response fails precisely where we need it: at
the action proﬁle under investigation.
Some additional remarks are in order. First, allowing for commitment to transfer utilities
conditional on actions being played, Jackson and Wilkie (2005) also show that eﬃciency might
not hold for two-player games. Whether eﬃciency holds if we allow for commitments to transfer
functions and actions is an open question. Second, Theorem 3 continues to hold if G is a game
with strategic complementarities, but not necessarily smooth. (See Appendix.) Third, eﬃcient
proﬁles on the boundary can in some games be implemented by commitments. This holds in
particular if a game has an eﬃcient Nash equilibrium on the boundary.
5.2 Pareto Improvements
While eﬃcient results are generically not implementable, a self-enforcing commitment might
nonetheless implement an improvement upon the status quo. In other words, the next question
20Moreover, any continuous function can be arbitrarily approximated by continuously diﬀerentiable functions
by Weierstrass Approximation Theorem —See Zeidler (1986, p. 770).
21Let T be a set of parameters indexing the payoﬀ functions i.e., for each player i ∈{ 1,2}, ui : X ×T → R.B y
genericity, we mean that there exists an open, dense subset of T for which any equilibrium result is ineﬃcient.
20we address is whether a commitment can implement a proﬁle that makes both players better oﬀ
compared to any equilibrium of the mother game G.
Deﬁnition 6 Ar e s u l tx∗ is an improvement upon the status quo if ui(x∗) ≥ ui(y∗) for all
i ∈{ 1,2},a n dui(x∗) >u i(y∗) for at least one player, where y∗ is an action proﬁle that is
eﬃcient in the set of mother Nash equilibria.22
It is not hard to ﬁnd games in which improvements upon the status quo can be implemented.
Just take any game with a unique Nash equilibrium y∗ and a lead-follow equilibrium that dom-
inates y∗.23 The lead-follow equilibrium can be implemented by the commitment in which the
leader restricts his action space to a singleton while the follower does not restrict his action space
at all. So the more interesting question is: can commitments be used to implement improve-
ments upon the status quo if none of the lead-follow equilibria represents such an improvement?
In our next result we show that this cannot happen if the players’ best responses are monotone
and if the players’ utilities are monotone in the actions of the opponent. We say that a game
satisﬁes constant consonance if any players payoﬀ is monotone in the action of the other player.
Theorem 4 Let G be a game with constant consonance such that the lead-follow equilibria do
not improve on the status quo. Then there exists an equilibrium improvement x∗ only if at least
one best-reply map is non-monotonic.
An important implication of Theorem 4 is that if G, in addition to be a game with constant
consonance is also a game with strategic complementarities or strategic substitutabilities, then
commitments do only serve to improve upon the status quo if the lead-follow equilibrium is
already itself such an improvement. This result sharply contrasts with Proposition 2 of Bernheim
and Whinston (1989), and illustrates how seemingly innocuous restrictions on the set of feasible
commitments can be critical. Bernheim and Whinston’s model and our model, albeit similar in
spirit, diﬀer in two important dimensions. First, in their model only one player (the principal)
has the opportunity to commit. Second, and more importantly, the principal does not only have
the power to commit himself (to take a single action) but he can also restrict the action set of
the other player, the agent. This contrasts with our model in which both players have the power
to commit and a player can only restrict his own action set.
Theorems 3 and 4 are rather negative results in that the power of commitment does not seem
to be of much social value. The following example shows that equilibrium improvements do exist
22Note that the set of equilibria N(G) is a compact set, hence eﬃciency is well deﬁned.
23This is the case for instance of any game with a strict second-mover advantage (e.g., diﬀerentiated Bertrand
duopoly). Since the payoﬀ of the ﬁrst mover in a lead-follow proﬁle is necessarily weakly higher than the highest
Nash equilibrium, the former Pareto dominates the latter.
21even in the case that neither of the lead-follow equilibria represents such an improvement.
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payoﬀs of ui(y∗)=4 /3, uj(y∗)=8 0 /3(1 −
√
3)  − 19.52. Moreover, the lead-follow proﬁle
(BR1(l2),l 2)=( 1 ,0) is associated to payoﬀs of u1((BR1(l2),l 2))) = 0,u 2((BR1(l2),l 2)) =
−1/9  − 0.11.
We now show that there exists a self-enforcing commitment which implements the action
proﬁle ˜ y =( 8 /9,1/9) with associated payoﬀs of u1(˜ y)=1 6 /9a n du2(˜ y)=−1441/81  − 17.79,
respectively. Clearly, both players’ payoﬀs improve upon the Nash equilibrium. According to
Proposition 2, at least one player’s action must be a best-reply against the action of the other
player. In the proﬁle ˜ y,w eh a v e8 /9=BR1(1/9).
Following Proposition 4, we can focus, without loss of generality, on only two candidates for
the restriction of player 1, [0,8/9] or [8/9,1]. We claim that player 1’s restriction cannot be
[0,8/9]. To see this, observe that if 1 commits to [0,8/9 ] ,t h e np l a y e r2c a nc o m m i tt o{1} and
gets a payoﬀ of −1/9( s i n c ebr
[0,8/9]
1 (1) = 0), which is higher than u2(˜ y). Therefore, the unique
candidate for 1’s restriction is [8/9,1]. In this case, player 1’s restricted best-reply is
br1(y2)=m a x{−4y2 +4
√
y2,8/9}. (4)
Observe that for all y2 ∈ [1/9,4/9], we have −4y2 +4
√
y2 ≥ 8/9. It follows that 2’s payoﬀ when
y2 / ∈ [1/9,4/9] is −(y2 − 2/9)2 − 160/9, which is maximized when y2 =1 /9. If y2 ∈ [1/9,4/9],
then player 2 maximizes u2(y)=−4y2 +4
√
y2. That the maximum is obtained when y2 =8 /9
is a simple matter of computation (albeit tedious) and is left to the reader.
226 Discussion
In this paper, we completely characterize the action proﬁles of strategic-form games, which are
implementable by unilateral commitments. We show that an action proﬁle is implementable if
and only if it is implementable by simple commitments, i.e., commitments in which a player
commits to a single action while the other player commits to a subset of actions that include his
mother best-reply to the commitment of his opponent. In turn, this result enables us to easily
characterize the implementable proﬁles of actions as solutions of simple optimization programs
under constraints (lead-follow proﬁles). The complete characterization of implementable actions
is our ﬁrst important result. Our second important result is that the set of implementable
proﬁles does not change if we allow the players to commit gradually. We also show that the
eﬃcient actions proﬁles are generically not implementable. This result sharply contrasts with
the situation in which players can sign binding agreements. However, bilateral commitments
can be Pareto-improving in that proﬁles of actions, which give a payoﬀ higher than the best
payoﬀ in any Nash equilibrium of the mother game to each player, can be implemented. Let
us now discuss some of the restrictions on the commitment technology we have considered, and
how our results are likely to change with altered assumptions.24
6.1 Non-convex restrictions
Relaxing the assumption of convex commitments leads us to consider general commitment
games.25 To circumvent the problem of the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium in each sub-
game we assume that the (mother) game G is a game with strategic complementarities.26 In
this case, the set of implementable outcomes in commitment games is a subset of the set of
implementable outcomes in general commitment games.27
Proposition 8 Let G be a game with strategic complementarities. If x∗ is implementable in a
commitment game, then x∗ is implementable in a general commitment game.
We give the intuition for this result for two periods, using the case of an implementable action
proﬁle x∗ with BR1(x∗
2)=x∗
1. More ﬂexibility in player 1’s commitment technology does not
help him: he already obtains the highest possible payoﬀ given the commitment of player 2. As
24Proofs of claims made in this section are available upon request.
25The compactness assumption has to be retained, however. For otherwise, an equilibrium does not exist.
26The game G has strategic complementarities (see e.g.,Topkis (1998)) if for yi ≥ y
 
i and yj ≥ y
 
j we have
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j). Cournot duopoly, diﬀerentiated Bertrand as well as all games
considered by Romano and Yildirim (2005) belong to this class of games.
27We say that an action proﬁle x
∗ is implementable in a general commitment game if there exists a subgame-
perfect equilibrium of the general commitment game with x
∗ being played in the last period (see Deﬁnition 2).
23for player 2, the additional ﬂexibility in his commitment technology indeed implies that he can
induce a larger set of proper subgames. However, any pure Nash equilibrium of these subgames
can also be obtained as an equilibrium of a game in which player 2 commits to a singleton
(a convex restriction). We next identify a class of games for which allowing for non-convex
commitment does not aﬀect the set of implementable outcomes. This suggests that assuming
convexity is without loss of generality in several important economic applications (including all
applications considered in Romano and Yildirim).
Proposition 9 Assume that the game G features constant externalities, the map ui(·,BR j(·))
is strictly quasi-concave and T =2 .I fx∗ is implementable by the general commitment X∗,t h e n
it is implementable by a simple commitment.
6.2 Multi-dimensional action spaces
Another natural extension is to consider multi-dimensional action spaces e.g., compact-convex
subsets of a n-dimensional Euclidean space. Unfortunately, we are not able to oﬀer a deﬁnitive
answer at this stage. For instance, it is not entirely clear how to translate our result about the
truncation at the top or bottom to the multi-dimensional realm. What does it mean to truncate
a sphere at the top? We can nonetheless oﬀer some preliminary remarks. For example, if we
assume that action spaces are Cartesian products and payoﬀ functions strictly quasi-concave
in each component of the multi-dimensional action of a player, all our results remain valid. In
general, we need to impose stronger conditions for (most of) our characterization to hold, more
particularly for Proposition 2 to remain valid. Indeed, the new complication is that a small
variation in one player action, from a proﬁle in which none of the players (mother) best reply,
might now change the restricted best-reply of the other player (by moving on the boundary of
its restricted action set). Additional conditions assures that this possible change does not aﬀect
too much the payoﬀ of the deviating player.
6.3 More than two players
While a full-ﬂedged analysis awaits future research, we can oﬀer a preliminary observation.
In the paper, we have seen that lead-follow proﬁles are always implementable in commitment
games based on two-player nice games. We might conjecture that this result also holds for three
players or more. The short answer is no. To see this, consider a Cournot triopoly game with
payoﬀ (1 − xi − xj − xk)xi for ﬁrm i. If ﬁrm 1 moves ﬁrst, ﬁrm 2 second and ﬁrm 3 last, the
equilibrium is (1/2,1/4,1/8). We claim that the commitment game induced by this Cournot
triopoly does not have an equilibrium with outcome (1/2,1/4,1/8). By contradiction, suppose
that the triple of commitment (X1,X 2,X 3) implements the proﬁle (1/2,1/4,1/8). Since the
24(mother) best-reply of ﬁrm 2 to (1/2,1/8) is 3/16, we should have that the lower bound of X2
is 1/4 by Lemma 1. Similarly, 1/2 has to be the lower bound of X1. We now show that ﬁrm 1
has an incentive to deviate from X1.I fX3 is bounded from above by 1/6, consider a deviation
by ﬁrm 1 to the commitment {1/2 − ε}. The induced game has a unique Nash equilibrium
(1/2 − ε,1/4,1/8) with a payoﬀ to ﬁrm 1 of (1/8+ε)(1/2 − ε), a proﬁtable deviation for ε
small enough. Similarly, if X3 is bounded from below by a ≤ 1/8, a deviation by ﬁrm 1 to the
commitment {1/2+ε} is proﬁtable for suﬃciently small ε. Therefore, lead-follow proﬁles of
games with three players or more are not necessarily implementable, which suggests that the
characterization of implementable proﬁles for such games is of a very diﬀerent nature that the
o n ew ep r o p o s e .
6.4 Transfers
To conclude, we mention an analogy with the literature on delegation games (see e.g., Fershtman
and Judd (1987) or Kockesen and Ok (2004)). Suppose that utilities are transferable. We can
then reinterpret the commitment to a set of actions as the commitment to transfer functions such
that actions that a player commits not to play are strictly dominated by all actions that a player
commits to play. Such transfers are equivalent to the action-forcing contracts in Fershtman and
Judd (1987). Whether the assumption of transferable utilities is appropriate or not depends on




Proof of Proposition 2. The proof proceeds by contradiction. Let s∗ =( X∗
i ,σ∗
i )i∈{1,2} be
an equilibrium of Γ, and suppose that (X∗,x ∗) the outcome of s∗ is such that x∗
i  = BRi(x∗
j)









2. Second, we show that there exists a strategy for
player 1, s 
1, such that the outcome of (s 
1,s ∗
2)i s( X∗,(x 
1,x ∗
2)), hence a contradiction with s∗
being an equilibrium.




i ∈{ 1,2}, i  = j. Suppose that brX∗
i (x∗
j)  = BRi(x∗
j) for all i ∈{ 1,2}, i  = j.B y c o n t i n u i t y
of BR2 and br
X∗
2
2 (remember that brX∗




1), there exists an open
interval (x∗
1−ε,x∗
1+ε)w i t hε>0 suﬃciently small such that for all x1 ∈ (x∗
1−ε,x∗





2.N e x tp i c kα ∈ [0,1) large enough such that x 
1 = αx∗




1 + ε). By construction of (x∗
1 − ε,x∗










2) since player 1’s payoﬀ function is strictly quasi-concave in x1.
Step 2. We claim that the strategy s 
1 =( {x 
1},σ∗
1) is a proﬁtable deviation for player 1. The
outcome of (s 
1,s ∗




2)), which, by construction, gives a strictly higher payoﬀ
to player 1.




2)) be an equilibrium of Γ with outcome
(X∗,x ∗). By Proposition 2, for at least one player, say player 1, we have x∗
1 = BR1(x∗
2). We
claim that the strategy proﬁle s  := (s∗
1,s  
2), with s 
2 =( {x∗
2},σ∗




First, observe that player 1 does not have an incentive to deviate from s∗
1 given player 2’s
strategy s 
2. Indeed, since player 2’s restriction is the singleton {x∗
2}, player 1 cannot obtain a
payoﬀ higher than u1(BR1(x∗
2),x ∗
2), which is the payoﬀ he obtains under s . Second, to show
that player 2 has no proﬁtable deviation, we use the one shot deviation property. Since s  agrees
with s∗ in all proper subgames of Γ, and s∗ is an equilibrium of Γ, player 2 has no proﬁtable
deviations in any of the proper subgames of Γ.
Suppose now that s  
2 =( X  
2,σ∗
2) was a proﬁtable deviation for player 2 given player 1’
strategy s∗
1. Since player 2 is indiﬀerent between (s∗
1,s  
2)a n ds∗, it follows that s  
2 is also a
proﬁtable deviation from s∗
2, a contradiction with our assumption that s∗ is an equilibrium.




j)) be an equilibrium of Γ with result
x∗, X∗
j =[ xj,xj], and x∗
j = BRj(x∗
i). Deﬁne s 
j =( [ x∗
j,1],σ∗
j)a n ds  






i,s   
j) is an equilibrium of Γ with result x∗. First, observe that both
strategy proﬁles under consideration have x∗ as their result. To see this, note that player i has
only one action x∗
i, and player j’s mother best response to x∗
i, BRj(x∗
i), is contained in his
restricted action space in either case. Second, note that player j does not have an incentive to
change his restricted action space given player i’s commitment to {x∗
i} as his restricted action
space contains his mother best-reply BRj(x∗
i) to the single action in player 1’s restricted action
space .
It remains to show that player i has no proﬁtable deviation from his commitment to {x∗
i}
given the commitment of player j to either [x∗
j,1] or [0,x ∗
j]. Since s∗ is an equilibrium of Γ, the set
of action proﬁles that give player i a payoﬀ strictly higher than ui(x∗), {x : ui(x) >u i(x∗)},d o e s
not intersect the graph of the restricted best-reply br
[xj,xj]
j of player j. For otherwise, player i
26would have a strictly proﬁtable deviation from s∗





i) − x 





i) − x 
j < 0. (A2)
We can also observe that for all xi ∈ [0,1],
br
[xj,xj]
j (xi) ≤ br
[x∗
j,xj]






j (xi) ≥ br
[xj,x∗
j]










i) − x 
j > 0.
This implies that given the commitment of player j to [x∗
j,1], player i cannot obtain a payoﬀ
strictly higher than u(x∗). Therefore, player i has no proﬁtable deviation from s∗




j) is an equilibrium of Γ. If (A1) does not hold, then (A2) must hold. If (A2) holds, we
can use the same arguments to show that x∗ is implementable by ({x∗
i},[0,x ∗
j]).
Proof of Proposition 5. Observe that we can rewrite conditions (i) and (ii) as follows. A
proﬁle x∗ is implementable by a bilateral commitment if and only if there exists a restriction
X∗
j such that x∗
i is a solution of the following program,
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨





















respect to xi. This is the program (P). Second, we check whether the solution obtained lies on
the graph of j’s best-reply BRj.
(⇒ )L e t s∗ =( Xi,σ∗
i )i∈{1,2} be an equilibrium of Γ, where X∗
1 = {x∗
1}.( T h ec a s ew h e n
X∗
2 = {x∗
2} is symmetric). Note that we make use of Proposition 3. For all X ∈Y ,t h e
mappings σ∗
1 and σ∗
2 are such that (σ∗
1(X),σ∗
2(X)) is a Nash equilibrium of G(X). In particular,
if X1 = {x1} for some x1 ∈ Y1,w eh a v eσ∗
2(X)=br
X2
2 (x1). Thus, for all deviations by player 1
to a strategy s1 =( {x1},σ∗





27any deviation by player 1 to a strategy s 
1 =( X 
1,σ∗
1)f o rs o m eX1 ∈Y 1 with result x is result-
equivalent to a deviation of the type s1 =( {x1},σ∗
1)s i n c ex2 = br
X∗
2
2 (x1) for both proﬁles of









2 (x1)), ∀ x1 ∈ Y1 .
That is, x∗
1 must be a solution of (P). By Proposition 2, we have x∗
i = BRi(x∗
j) for at least
one player i ∈{ 1,2}. Suppose that x∗
2  = BR2(x∗
1). Then, given ({x∗
1},σ∗
1), player 2 is better-oﬀ
d e v i a t i n gt o( {BR2(x∗
1)},σ∗
2), a contradiction with s∗ being an equilibrium. Hence, we have
x∗
2 = BR2(x∗
1), and therefore, x∗
1 is solution of (P∗).
(⇐ ) Suppose that x∗







2), where the mappings σ∗
1 and σ∗
2 are such that (σ∗
1(X),σ∗
2(X))
is a Nash equilibrium of G(X), for all X ∈Y . Clearly, the outcome of s∗ is (x∗
1,x ∗
2), and by
construction it is a Nash equilibrium of G({x∗
1}×X∗
2).28 By construction, for all subgames G(X),
the actions (σ∗
1(X),σ∗
2(X)) constitute a Nash equilibrium of G(X). Hence, according to the one-
shot deviation property, it suﬃces to check that there is no ﬁrst-stage deviation to obtain that




1}, player 2 cannot obtain a
better payoﬀ than u2(x∗), and thus has no proﬁtable deviation. As for player 1, suppose that




2). Let ˜ x be the outcome
of the proﬁle (s1,s ∗
2). Since s1 is a proﬁtable deviation, we then have u1(˜ x) >u 1(x∗). By
construction of the mapping σ2,w eh a v e˜ x2 = br
X∗
2
2 (˜ x1), a contradiction with the fact that x∗
1 is
as o l u t i o no f( P).
B Proofs related to the multi-period game of commitments, ΓT
Lemma A1 Let x∗ ∈ N(G). The proﬁle x∗ is implementable in ΓT(G).
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Proposition 1, and left to the reader. 
Lemma A2 Let x∗ be implementable in ΓT(G). We have x∗
i = BRi(x∗
j) for at least one player
i ∈{ 1,2}.
Proof. The proof proceeds by contradiction. Suppose that x∗ is implementable in ΓT(G)b y
the strategy proﬁle s∗, but x∗
i  = BRi(x∗
j) for all players i ∈{ 1,2}. Assume that x∗
i >B R i(x∗
j)f o r
both players. (The other cases are treated similarly.) Let s∗
i(ht)=[ xt
i,xt
i]w h e r eht is the history
28Since x
∗










2. Moreover, single-valuedness of BR2 implies that x
∗









28at period t on the equilibrium path. From Lemma 1 in the main text, we have that x∗
i = xT
i for
both players. Let ht∗
be the last history on the equilibrium path of s∗ such that x
t∗
i
i  = xT
i for
at least one player i ∈{ 1,2}. Such an history exists as the empty history (i.e., the beginning of
the game) satisﬁes this inequality. Without loss of generality, assume xt∗
1  = xT
1 . Moreover, as






2 for any t ≥ t∗+1. We
now show that player 1 has a proﬁtable deviation at history ht∗





1  = ∅ suﬃciently close to x∗








2 is the restriction played by player 2 at history ht∗
under s∗









1(h) for any other history h. Following the history (ht∗
,({x 
1}×Xt∗+1
2 )), the unique






1)) = (x 
1,x ∗
2). Strict quasi-concavity of u1
thus implies that s 
1 is a proﬁtable deviation for player 1, a contradiction. 
Proof of Theorem 2. (⇐). The proof is trivial if T = 1. Suppose that T ≥ 2. Let x∗





1). We now show that we can implement x∗ in
ΓT(G). To this end, consider the strategies in ΓT(G) such that player 1 chooses the restriction
{x∗
1} in the ﬁrst stage (and, hence in all subsequent stages) and player 2 restricts to X∗
2 at the
initial history and at all subsequent histories ht of length t<T . Formally, we consider any




2 at the initial history h0,a n df o r
any history ht =( h0,({x∗
1}×X∗





proﬁle satisfying this requirement yields the result x∗.S i n c e x∗
2 = BR2(x∗
1), and given that
player 1 restricts to the singleton {x∗
1}, player 2 has no incentive to deviate. As for player 1,
observe that he can only deviate at the ﬁrst stage. Consider a ﬁrst-stage deviation by player 1 to
X1. The induced game is ΓT−1(G(X1 × X∗
2)), and let x  be a Nash equilibrium of G(X1 × X∗
2).
By Lemma A1, there exists a proﬁle of strategies s∗|X1×X∗
2 such that x  is implementable in
ΓT−1(G(X1 × X∗
2)), with s∗|X1×X∗
2 a proﬁle of strategies following the history (h0,(X1 × X∗
2)).
(More precisely, let s be any proﬁle of strategies of ΓT, s|h is the proﬁle of strategies induced by
s after history h i.e., si| 
h = si(h,h ) for any h  in the set of histories following history h.) Note
that since x  is the Nash equilibrium of G(X1 × X∗







1 ∈ argmaxx1∈Y1 u1(x1,br
X∗
2
2 (x1)), we have u1(x∗) ≥ u1(x ). It follows that the strategies
in which player 1 commits to {x∗
1} in the ﬁrst stage, player 2 commits to X∗
2 at the initial history
and at all subsequent histories ht of length t<T,p l a y e r sp l a ys∗|X1×X∗
2 following any ﬁrst-stage
deviation of player 1 implements x∗. (To be complete, assume that the strategies prescribe the
play of an equilibrium after any other type of histories.)
29(⇒). Let s∗ be a subgame perfect equilibrium of ΓT(G) that implements the proﬁle x∗,a n d
denote (X1
1,X1
2) the restriction played in the ﬁrst stage of ΓT(G). From Lemma A2, it follows
that x∗
i = BRi(x∗
j) for at least one player i ∈{ 1,2}. W.l.o.g., suppose that x∗
2 = BR2(x∗
1).
We claim that the commitment ({x∗
1},X1
2) implements x∗ in Γ(G). Player 2 has clearly no
incentive to deviate given the commitment of player 1 to {x∗
1}. Consider now player 1, and
suppose that player 1 has a proﬁtable deviation X 
1 from his commitment {x∗
1}. Following
player 1’s deviation, the induced game is G(X 
1 × X1
2), and let x  be a Nash equilibrium of
G(X 
1 × X1
2)w i t hu1(x ) >u 1(x∗). (Note that we implicitly consider the proﬁle of strategies
((X 
1,σ 1)(X1






1)s i n c ex  is a Nash equilibrium of G(X 
1 × X1
2). This implies that {x 
1} is
also a proﬁtable deviation for player 1 in Γ(G). We now show that the existence of such a
deviation in Γ(G) contradicts the fact that s∗ is a subgame perfect equilibrium of ΓT(G). To
see this, consider the strategy s 
1 in which player 1 plays {x 
1} in the ﬁrst period of ΓT(G)a n d
play according to s∗
1 at any other history. Consider the subgame starting after this deviation by
player 1. We then have the game ΓT−1(G({x 
1}×X1
2)). Clearly, in any result of this subgame
player 1, plays x 





proﬁle of strategies (s 
1,s ∗





1)). It follows that
s 
1 is a proﬁtable deviation for player 1 given the strategy s∗
2 of player 2, which implies that
(s∗
1,s ∗
2) cannot be an equilibrium of ΓT(G), a contradiction. We conclude that x∗ must also be
implementable in Γ(G).
C Proofs related to the geometry
Proof of Proposition 6. Let x∗ be an implementable proﬁle of actions with x∗
j = BRj(x∗
i),
and x∗ interior. By contradiction, suppose that the slope of indiﬀerence curve of player i at x∗
is negative while the slope of BRj at x∗ is positive.
Deﬁne Q+ := {y ∈ [0,1]2 : y ≥ x∗} and Q− = {y ∈ [0,1]2 : y ≤ x∗}.29 Since the indiﬀerence
curve of player i at x∗ is negatively sloped, there exists an ε>0 such that either ui(y) >u i(x∗)
for all y ∈B ε(x∗) ∩ (Q+ \{ x∗}) or such that ui(y) >u i(x∗) for all y ∈B ε(x∗) ∩ (Q− \{ x∗}),
where Bε(x∗)i sa no p e nb a l lo fr a d i u sε around x∗.
Let f : X → Y be a function. We denote Grf the graph of f. Since the slope of BRj at x∗
29Let x and y two vectors in R
n.W ew r i t ex ≥ y if xi ≥ yi for all i ∈{ 1,...,n}
















j ∩ (Bε(x∗) ∩ Q− \{ x∗}),
are non-empty sets, hence the graph of player j’s restricted best-reply intersects player i’s strict
upper contour set at x∗.
Finally, from Theorem 1, the two simple commitments that could possibly implement the




i),1]). It follows from the above arguments
that x∗ cannot be a solution of the optimization program described in Proposition 5 (since the
graph of player j’s restricted best-reply intersects player i’s strict upper contour set at x∗), hence
a contradiction with x∗ being implementable. The same argument follows mutatis mutandum
for the other cases.
Lemma A3 Let G be a game with strategic complementarities and positive consonance i.e., ui
is non-decreasing in xj, j  = i, for all i ∈ N. We have li ≥ x∗
i(K).
Proof. Suppose that x∗
i(k +1 ) >l i >x ∗
i(k). Since, BRj is non-decreasing, we have
BRj(x∗
i(k +1 ) )≥ BRj(li) ≥ BRj(x∗
i(k)), hence
ui(li,BR j(x∗
i(k +1 ) )≥ ui(li,BR j(li)) (A3)
since ui has positive consonance. Moreover, since x∗
i(k+1) is the unique best-reply to x∗
j(k+1) =
BRj(x∗
i(k +1 ) )( x∗(k + 1) is a Nash equilibrium), we have
ui(x∗
i(k +1 ) ,x ∗
j(k +1 ) )>u i(li,BR j(x∗
i(k +1 ) )
≥ ui(li,BR j(li)) ≥ ui(x∗
i(k +1 ) ,x ∗
j(k +1 ) ) ,
(A4)
a contradiction. A similar argument shows that li could not be smaller than x∗
i(1). 
Proof of Proposition 7. We ﬁrst start with a preliminary observation. The best-reply
of player i separates the action space [0,1]2 into two regions: one region in which player i’s
indiﬀerence curves are negatively sloped, one region in which player i’s indiﬀerence curves are
positively sloped. To prove this result, ﬁx an action x∗
j of player j, and consider the best-reply
x∗
i = BRi(x∗
j)o fp l a y e ri to x∗
j. Deﬁne IC := {x ∈ [0,1]2 : ui(x)=ui(x∗)}. For any xi  = x∗
i,w e
have ui(xi,x ∗
j) <u i(x∗)s i n c ex∗
i is the unique best-reply to x∗
j.N e x t ,i fxj <x ∗
j, it follows from
31ui increasing in xj that ui(xi,x j) ≤ ui(xi,x ∗
j) <u i(x∗), hence (xi,x j) / ∈ IC. Therefore, for any
xi, we need xj >x ∗
j for (xi,x j)t ob e l o n gt oIC. Hence, we have that for any xi <x ∗
i, IC is
negatively sloped and for any xi >x ∗
i, IC is positively sloped.
As a second observation, note that for any xi ∈ [x∗
i(k),x ∗
i(k +1 ) ] ,BRi(BRj(xi)) − xi is
either positive or negative, but does not alternate in signs. For otherwise, there exists another
equilibrium in (x∗
i(k),x ∗
i(k+1)), a contradiction with the deﬁnition of the x∗(k)’s. Moreover, we
have that BRi(BRj(xi))−xi < 0 for any xi ∈ (x∗
i(k),x ∗
i(k+1)) ifk is odd, BRi(BRj(xi))−xi >
0, if k is even. In words, the graph of player i’s best-reply is to the ‘left’ of the graph of
player j’s best-reply if k is odd, and to the ‘right’ if k is even. (See Figure 5.) Furthermore,
BRi(BRj(xi)) − xi > 0 for any xi <x ∗
i(1) and BRi(BRj(xi)) − xi < 0 for any xi >x ∗
i(K).30
Fix a proﬁle of actions x with xj = BRj(xi)a n dxi ∈ (x∗
i(k),x ∗
i(k +1 ) )f o rs o m ek even.
We want to show that this proﬁle is not implementable. From the previous observation, we
have that BRi(xj)=BRi(BRj(xi)) >x i. From the ﬁrst observation, it then follows that
the indiﬀerence curve of player i at x is negatively sloped. Since BRj is positively sloped, it
follows from Proposition 6 that x is not implementable. A similar argument holds for any x
with xj = BRj(xi)a n dxi <x ∗
i(1).






for some k odd. We want to show that any such a proﬁle is implementable by the simple bilateral
commitment ({x∗
i},[0,BR j(x∗
i)]). The key observation is that the best-reply of player i is now
to the ‘left’ of the best-reply of player j i.e., BRi(BRj(x∗
i)) <x ∗
i. (See Figure 5.) Hence,



















BRj(xi) for any xi ≤ x∗
i, henceforth the maximum of ui(·,br
X∗
j
j (·)) is achieved in x∗
i by strict
quasi-concavity of ui(·,BR j(·)). It follows that x∗ is implementable (step 4).





is implementable by the simple bilateral commitment ({x∗
i},[0,BR j(x∗
i)]).
D Proofs related to the welfare
Proof of Theorem 3. Let (X∗,x ∗) be any equilibrium outcome of Γ(G) such that X∗ is
simple, and x∗ is interior. Let T be a set of parameters and deﬁne the family of payoﬀ functions
: ui : X × T → R, for all i ∈{ 1,2}. We want to show that for a dense open subset T∗ of T,
30By contradiction, suppose that BRi(BRj(xi)) − xi < 0 for any xi <x i(1). In particular, for xi = 0, i.e., for
the lower bound of Yi,w eh a v e0≤ BRi(BRj(0)) − 0 < 0, a contradiction.
32x∗ is ineﬃcient. If x∗ is an equilibrium of the mother game G, the result follows from Theorem
1 of Dubey (1986). If x∗ is not an equilibrium of the mother game G, the proof is similar to
the proof of Theorem 1 of Dubey. The proof is as follows. Deﬁne the directional mapping













and let Dt(·) be the restriction of D to t.T h u s ,Dt(x∗) is the Jacobian matrix evaluated at x∗.
A key step in Dubey’s proof is to observe that at any interior equilibrium x∗ of G, the diagonal
elements of the Jacobian matrix are zero, and that the set of 2 × 2 matrices with zeros on the
diagonal is a sub-manifold of R4 of co-dimension 2. If x∗ is not an equilibrium of G,w eh a v ea
similar result, that is, we can show that if x∗ is an equilibrium result of Γ, then Dt(x∗) ∈ A∩B,
with A ∩ B a sub-manifold of R4 of co-dimension 2. This step is the only step that diﬀers with
Dubey’s proof.
First, from Lemma 2, for at least one player, we have x∗
i = BRi(xj). Without loss of
generality, suppose that x∗
2 = BR2(x∗
1). Since x∗ is interior, we then have that ∂u2
∂x2(x∗)=0 .
This equality is our ﬁrst constraint on the Jacobian matrix. Formally, deﬁne the set
A = {M ∈ R4 : M22 =0 }, (A6)
i.e., the set of 2 × 2 matrices with a zero on the diagonal. Observe that if x∗ is an equilibrium
result, then Dt(x∗) ∈ A,o rx∗ ∈ D−1
t (A). The set A is a sub-manifold of R4 of co-dimension 1.









2 (x1)) for all x1 ∈ Y1. We show that these inequalities impose a relationship between








not diﬀerentiable in x∗
1. We use the concepts of subgradient and subdiﬀerential to circumvent
this problem.31
For any function f : Z → R,d e n o t e∂f(z) the subdiﬀerential of f at z. We refer the
reader to Clarke (1989, Chapter 1) or Rockafellar (1981, Chapter 3) for rigorous deﬁnitions of
subdiﬀerentials. As an example, if f(z)=|z|,t h e n∂f(0) = [−1,1].
Since u2 is twice continuously diﬀerentiable, BR2 is continuously diﬀerentiable, hence Lips-
chitz continuous. From Lemma 1, it then follows that br
X∗
2
2 is Lipschitz continuous. Note that
Rademacher Theorem implies that br
X∗
2
2 is diﬀerentiable almost everywhere. Let us consider the
31We refer the reader to Rockafellar (1981) for a good source on the theory of subgradients and non-smooth
optimization.
33subdiﬀential of v1(·): =−u1(·,br
X∗
2
2 (·)) at x∗


















1 minimizes v1,0∈ ∂v1(x∗













the required relationship. (Note that if br
X∗
2
2 is diﬀerentiable at x∗




2 evaluated at x∗
1.)
For any scalar a, deﬁne the set
B = {M ∈ R4 : M11 + aM12 =0 }, (A9)
i.e., the set of 2 × 2 matrices with a linear relationship between the two ﬁrst entries. It follows
that if x∗ is an equilibrium result, then Dt(x∗) ∈ B,o rx∗ ∈ D−1
t (B) (take a = ξ). The set B
is a submanifold of R4 of co-dimension 1. It then follows that A ∩ B is a submanifold of R4 of
co-dimension 2, as required.
Finally, deﬁne the set
C = {M ∈ R4 :t h er o w so fM are linearly dependent}. (A10)
It is easy to see that if x∗ is eﬃcient, then Dt(x∗) ∈ C,o rx∗ ∈ D−1
t (C). For otherwise, there
exists a neighborhood O of x∗ and a x  ∈ O such that ui(x )=ui(x∗)+εi, εi > 0, for all player




















Hence, if a proﬁle x∗ is an equilibrium result and eﬃcient, then Dt(x∗) ∈ A ∩ B ∩ C or
x∗ ∈ D−1
t (A ∩ B ∩ C).
The next step is to show that for a dense open set T∗ ⊂ T, D−1
t (A ∩ B ∩ C)i se m p t y .T o
do so, we shall show that the co-dimension of D−1
t (A ∩ B ∩ C) is 2, that is the dimension of Y ,
hence is empty. This step is found in Dubey’s proof.
Ineﬃciency and a non-smooth game
Assume that the game G is a game with strategic complementarities and negative consonance
i.e., xj  → ui(xi,x j) is decreasing in xj for each player i ∈ N, i  = j.N o t et h a tG is not assumed
to be smooth.
34The ﬁrst observation is that BR1(BR2(x∗
1)) ≤ x∗










wise. Henceforth, if BR1(BR2(x∗
1)) >x ∗
1, we have that player 2’s best-reply to BR1(BR2(x∗
1))
is BR2(x∗
1), hence a contradiction with x∗
1 maximizing player 1’s payoﬀ on the constrained
best-reply of player 2.








2) improves upon 2’s payoﬀ.
Finally, since at an equilibrium x∗ of Γ, x∗
2 = BR2(x∗




with a strict inequality if x∗ is not a Nash equilibrium of G.
It follows that (BR1(x∗
2),x ∗
2) Pareto-improves upon x∗, hence x∗ is not eﬃcient. Finally,
observe that the result also holds if we assume strategic substitutes and payoﬀ increasing in the
action of the opponent.
Proof of Theorem 4 Let (X∗,x ∗) be an equilibrium outcome of Γ and assume that x∗ is
an improvement upon the status quo. Let xN be a Nash equilibrium, which is eﬃcient in the
set of Nash equilibria, for which we have ui(x∗) ≥ ui(xN)f o ri ∈{ 1,2} with at least one strict
inequality. Using Proposition 2, we can assume that x∗
2 = BR2(x∗
1). By our assumption that
neither of the lead-follow equilibria is an improvement upon the status quo, we have that
u2(x∗) ≥ u2(xN) >u 2(l1,BR 2(l1)).
Observe that in all the three proﬁles, player 2 is best replying to player 1’s action. Fur-
thermore, as player 2’s payoﬀ function is monotonic in his opponent’s action, we have that
u∗
2(x1): =u2(x1,BR 2(x1)) is a monotonic function of x1, hence x∗
1 and l1 must lie on two diﬀer-
ent sides of xN
1 i.e., we must have either l1 ≥ xN
1 ≥ x∗
1 or l1 ≤ xN
1 ≤ x∗
1. Since best-reply maps
are single valued, we also have that l1  = xN
1  = x∗
1.
Moreover, since xN and (l1,BR 2(l1)) both lie on the graph of player 2’s mother best-reply
and u1 is continuous, we have
u1(l1,BR 2(l1)) ≥ u1(x∗) ≥ u1(xN).
Assume that player 2’s best-reply function is monotonic. We will show that l1 and x∗
1 cannot lie
on two diﬀerent sides of xN
1 , and give to player 1 a payoﬀ higher than his Nash payoﬀ whenever
35player 1’s payoﬀ function is monotonic in his opponent’s action and best-reply functions are
monotonic.
We ﬁrst start with the case in which the best-reply function BR2 is non-decreasing and the
player 1’s payoﬀ function has positive consonance i.e., x2  → u1(x1,x 2) is non-decreasing. From
Lemma A3, we have l1 >x N
1 , therefore l1 >x N
1 >x ∗
1 since l1 and x∗
1 must lie on two diﬀerent
sides of xN
1 .M o r e o v e r ,BR2(xN
1 ) ≥ BR2(x∗
1). It thus follows that
u1(xN
1 ,BR 2(xN
1 )) >u 1(x∗
1,BR 2(xN
1 )) ≥ u1(x∗
1,BR 2(x∗
1)),
where the ﬁrst strict inequality follows by strict quasi-concavity and the second by positive
consonance, a contradiction.
Second, consider the case in which the best-reply function BR2 is non-decreasing and the
player 1’s payoﬀ function has negative consonance i.e., x2  → u1(x1,x 2) is non-increasing. An
immediate modiﬁcation of Lemma A3 implies that l1 <x N








1 )) >u 1(x∗
1,BR 2(xN
1 )) ≥ u1(x∗
1,BR 2(x∗
1)),
where the ﬁrst strict inequality follows by strict quasi-concavity and the second by negative
consonance, a contradiction.
The other cases are similar and left to the reader.
E Proofs related to general (non-convex) commitments
Proof of Proposition 8. Let T = 2. Assume that the proﬁle x∗ is implementable by X∗.S i n c e
x∗ is implementable, it follows from Theorem 1 that x∗ is implementable by the commitment
({x∗
i},X∗
j )w i t hx∗
j = BRj(x∗
i). Let us show that x∗ is also implementable in a general commit-
ment game. First, since player j’s payoﬀ is the highest payoﬀ player j c a no b t a i nw h e np l a y e ri is
committed to x∗
i,p l a y e rj has no proﬁtable deviation. Second, if player i deviates to any general
commitment Xi (non-necessarily convex), the induced game is G(Xi×X∗
j ). Since this game is a
game with strategic complementarities, it has a pure Nash equilibrium ˜ x := (˜ xi,br
X∗
j
j (˜ xi)) with









j (xi)) = ui(x∗),
hence the deviation is not proﬁtable.
Let T>2. To implement x∗ in the general commitment game, consider the following
strategies. Player i commits to {x∗
i} and player j to X∗
j in the ﬁrst period. In period t>1,
36player j continue to play X∗
j if he has always played X∗
j in the previous t − 1 periods. Player
i has no choice but to play {x∗
i}. Following a deviation to Xt
j by player j at period t,p l a y e rj
plays {˜ xj} where (x∗
i, ˜ xj) is a pure Nash equilibrium of G({x∗
i}×Xt
j). If either player deviates
in the ﬁrst period, the strategies require them to commit to a pure Nash equilibrium of the
game induced by their deviation in the next period. In the last period, the strategies prescribe
the play of a pure Nash equilibrium. It follows from the proof of Proposition 1 and the above
arguments that x∗ is implementable.
Proof of Proposition 9. Assume that the game features positive externalities (the arguments
are similar if we assume negative externalities). Let x∗ be implementable by the general com-
mitment (X∗
i ,X∗
j ) and assume that x∗




j], it is convex. We
ﬁrst show that x∗ is implementable by the commitment (X∗
i ,X∗∗
j ). By strict quasi-concavity,
we have that x∗ is a Nash equilibrium of G(X∗
i × X∗∗
j ) (See Lemma 1). Moreover, since x∗ is
implementable by X∗,p l a y e rj has no incentive to deviate from X∗∗
j . To see this, suppose that
player j has a proﬁtable deviation i.e., there exists a commitment Xj such that all equilibria of
G(X∗
i × Xj) gives player j a payoﬀ strictly higher than uj(x∗). Then, we have a contradiction
with x∗ being implementable by X∗ since subgame perfection requires to play a Nash equilib-
rium of G(X∗
i × Xj). All these equilibria would give to player j a payoﬀ strictly higher than
uj(x∗). Similarly, the graph of br
X∗
j
j is included in the lower contour set LCi(x∗)o fp l a y e ri at




also included in LCi(x∗). Loosely speaking, we want to show that player i cannot “move” along
the graph of player j’s restricted best-reply and ﬁnd a proﬁle that strictly improves his payoﬀ
over ui(x∗). For otherwise, he would have a proﬁtable deviation.










LCi(x∗). Second, for all xi ∈ [0,1] such that br
X∗∗
j
j (xi) <b r
X∗
j




j (xi)) ≤ ui(xi,br
X∗
j
j (xi)) ≤ ui(x∗),
where the ﬁrst inequality comes from positive externalities and the second from the fact that
the graph of br
X∗
j
j is in LCi(x∗). Third, consider all xi ∈ [0,1] such that br
X∗∗
j








j (xi)) ≤ ui(xi,br
X∗∗
j
j (xi)) ≤ ui(xi,x ∗
j),




j (xi) for all xi ∈ [0,1]. Suppose that there exists
a˜ xi with br
X∗∗
j
j (˜ xi) >b r
X∗
j
j (˜ xi) such that ui(˜ xi,x ∗
j) >u i(x∗
i,x ∗
j). Since BRj is increasing and
x∗
j <B R j(x∗
i), there either exists a ˆ xi <x ∗
i such that BRj(ˆ xi)=x∗
j or BRj(xi) >x ∗
j for all









j (˜ xi) >b r
X∗
j




j , a contradiction
with the strict-quasi concavity of the payoﬀ function and x∗
j ∈ X∗
j . Consequently, the strict
quasi-concavity of ui implies that ui(xi,x ∗
j) >u i(x∗) for all xi ∈ [ˆ xi,x ∗
j], a contradiction since
these points belong to the graph of br
X∗
j . Consider now the latter case i.e., BRj(xi) >x ∗
j for all
xi ∈ [0,1]. In this case, we show that br
X∗∗
j
j (xi) ≤ br
X∗
j
j (xi) for all xi ∈ [0,1]. To see this, suppose
there exists a ˆ xi such that br
X∗∗
j
j (ˆ xi) >b r
X∗
j












j (ˆ xi), a contradiction
since x∗
j ∈ X∗





j >B R j(x∗






i), strict quasi-concavity of the map xi  → ui(xi,BR j(xi)) implies that x∗ is




i),1]), two simple commitments.
For instance, suppose that the lead-follow proﬁle (li,BR j(li)) is higher than (x∗
i,BR j(x∗
i)), then
x∗ is implementable by the simple commitment ({x∗
i},[0,BR j(x∗









j for any xi >x ∗
i since BRj
is increasing. Clearly, strict quasi-concavity of the map xi  → ui(xi,BR j(xi)) implies that player
i has no proﬁtable deviation to ˜ xi ≤ x∗
i. Suppose he has a proﬁtable deviation to ˜ xi >x ∗
i.F i r s t ,
if (˜ xi,x ∗
j) belongs to the graph of br
X∗
j
j , we have a contradiction. Second, if (˜ xi,x ∗
j)d o e sn o t
belong to the graph of br
X∗
j
j ,t h e nbr
X∗
j
j (˜ xi) >x ∗




j (˜ xi)) ≥ ui(˜ xi,x ∗
j) >u i(x∗),
again a contradiction with the implementation of x∗ by the general commitment X∗.T oc o m p l e t e
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